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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
\\rll,FUED 'VHEATL\",

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

TEA ~I STERS L 0 C A L UNION
~~~. affiliated with I N T E RNATIOX AL BROTHERHOOD OF
TE1\~IS'TERS,
CHAUFFEURS,
\\' AREHOUSEMEN and HELPERS OF AMERICA, and WILLL\~1 II. F.ACKRELL,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
9908

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

ST A TEl\IENT
Plaintiff employed as a truck driYer by Union Pacific
:\lotor Freight Company was discharged following three
warning notice~ because of several successive Yiolations
of company rule~. Three weeks later at the instance of
the plaintiff the defendant Fackrell, agent of the de-
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fendent union, succeeded in persuading the company t<J
rehire the plaintiff to his former employment. Plaintiff
refused to accept such offer on the part of the company
unless the company paid him for fifteen ,shifts he had lost
while waiting for Fackrell to negotiate a rehiring of
plaintiff by the company. The company refused to pay
the plaintiff for such waiting time loss; thereupon plaintiff reque,sted the defendant union to process his alleged
grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the company and the defendant union.
Thereafter the f.our steps were taken pu:tsuant to such
oontract arbitration 1nachinery and at each step the company refused to pay plaintiff any waiting time compensation.
During the hearing in the Newhouse Hotel pursuant
to ~step four the Board of Arbitration consisting of six
members and a secretary heard testimony from both
·side's of the ·controversy including plaintiff's personal
te~Stimony. Following such hearing the board decided that
the company discharged plaintiff for good cause; that is
to say, the hoard sustained the position of the company.
Thereafter plaintiff brought the instant action to recover
damages from defendants upon the ground that the defendant Fackrell failed to supply sufficient evidence to
.support the defense o.f plaintiff made by Fackrell at the
~ ewhouse Hotel hearing and that plaintiff wais discriminatorily discharged by the company.
Briefly, the defendants' position is that the company
retained it~ usual right and auth'ority to fire an employee
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for good eaww, no cause, dis<'riminately or otherwise,

insofar as a juri·sdiction of the state court and issues
here prrsen ted are <.·oncerned.
Plaintiff alleges in h1s complaint that his "discharge
wa:-; without cause and was discriminatory.'' Plaintiff
l'n•ply admitted his discharge was for good cause, the sole
rl'tnaining ground would be discrimination; assuming
that to he so, the jurisdiction of the state court would be
plainly superseded by that of the National Labor Relations Board.
The term · 'discri1nination'' in the area of industrial
labor relations has a special, general and well-known
meaning. It involves always an intent on the part of the
employer to distinguish in the treatment of an eiDJPloyee
on the basis of labor union activity or affiliation. When
an employer resorts to discrimination among his employees in the convenHonal industrial economic sense he
thereby encourages or discourage,s member.ship in a
labor organization - a subject matter we are not concerned ";th here. The plaintiff takes the firm position
that he was discrhninatorily discharged; hence that the
~· discharge was legal and Yalid is admitted, unless plain~ tiff refers to discrimination in the federal statutory area
~ in which even the state court would lack juri.sdiction.
!1 An etnployer usually needs no rea~son to fire an employee.
The employer always retains his basic right ·to fire an
employee unlPi'S he contracts to do otherwise, and in this
il
matter Union Pacific Freight Company, the employer,
t!
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made no such agreement. The fact is, the contrary appears.
Therefore the plaintiff having aiPparently predicated
his recovery exclusively upon the sole ground of discriminatory discharge, there remains n~o means by which
the company could be legally forced against its will torehire plaintiff or cou1pensate hin1 for \Vaiting time while
defendant Fackrell was subsequently negotiating a rehire
of plaintiff. Whether the defendants expended much or
little skill and diligence in processing plaintiff's alleged
grievance pursuant to the contractual arbitration agreement is of no ·moment and ·beside the point. Such arbitraHon procedure activity on the part of the defendant was
an endeavor i:Q the nature of a collateral service, a bonus
or serendipity exercised because of plaintiff's membership card.

TE1STIMONY OF PLAINTIFF
\Vilfred Wheatly, the plaintiff, testified that he was
fired by the Union Pacific Motor Freight Company on
l\1:ay 27, 1960; (T 9-10) that defendant, Fackrell, found
a heavy-duty driver job for Wheatly with Carbon Motor
\Vays, but Wheatly refused to take the job (T 15-16-17);
that he received a notice fron1 Union Pacific Motor
Freight Company, his employer, to report back to work
on .Tune 14, 1960, that he refused to return to work
(T-19); that step 3, pursuant to the arbitration machin·
pry set forth in the collective bargaining agreement be·
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tween the defendant union and Union Pacific Motor
~,reight \Y ays was held in the Teamsters' Building July
1;), 1H60 ( T ~4) ; that step -l-, pursuant to the arbitrati~on
proredure, about ~(i people present, was held at the Newhousl' Hotel ~Pptember 20, 1960, (T 25); that he testified
in his own behalf (T 29); that the Board of Arbitrators
sustained the company's discharge of Wheatly (T 30).
\Yheatly admitted he had received three warning letters
from the company before he was fired; (T 35) that two
'rarning letters are sufficient for discharge under the collt>din• bargaining agreement (T 35); that the defendant,
Farkrell, was successful in restoring him to his job three
weeks after he was discharged (T 36-37); that after defendant Farkrell had gotten him restored to his former
jllh with full rights, he refused to return to the job be('ausr the company did not pay him for 15 ·shifts he had
lost while not working (T 38-39); that he was fired formerly from both Pacific Intermountain Express Company
and Orange Transportation Company for failure to report to work (T 57), similar reasons for which he was
fired from Union Pacific :\Iotor Freight Company (T 63).

ARGUMENT
~
~~
!l

POINT I
ADMITTED FACTS SHOW PLAINTIFF WAS DISCHARGED FOR GOOD CAUSE.
If it i:' a~sumed that the plaintiff was discharged by
tlw rompany for good cause, any alleged damage for loss
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of time or discrimination on the part of the company or
careles·sness on the part of the defendants in failing to
persuade the company to reinstate plaintiff to his fonner
status without penalty or loss of time, would become irrevelant and rnoot.
After the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony, the
court dismissed the cause. The facts edveloped at that
time seem neither c01nplex nor prolix. Defendants' position was then that the vlaintiff having quite freely admitted that he was discharged by the Union Pacific Motor
Freight Company, his employer, for g·ood cause, defeated
his action. Plaintiff also admitted that the defendants
succeeded in getting his job re,stored to him after a short
lay-off; also, admitted that he refused to take the job
back unless he got paid about $375.00 for loss of time
during which plaintiff was off duty while the defendants
were eng~ged in persuading the company to hire him back
on the job; also admitted that the Board of Arbitrators
that heard the case, including plaintiff's testimony, had
found that the company for good cause had discharged
the 'Plaintiff. In such situation, defendants' positi1on was
that plaintiff was obviously not entitled to $37'5.00 or any,
other amount ·while waiting for the defendants to persuade the company to put plaintiff hack on his job, be·
cause and by reason of the manifest facts that the company had good reasons for the discharge.
The precipitate of ,plaintiff's position is set forth in
the following quote from his testimony:
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a~ a result of your being discharged,
you hadn't worked for the company, performed
no services whatsoever for a period of fifteen
working days. Is that right?

''Q. Now,

A. Yes.
(~.

You had performed no services 1

A. No services.

rt

~1

Q. So you had the option to come back to take
your job, but you refused 1Jo becaus-e you
wanted the company to pay you for those fifteen days you did not work?

A. Yes, that's right.
Q.

~ow,

you could have gone back to work, and
that is all the damage you would have sustained was tJo be out fifteen days' work. Is that
rightt

A. That's right.
Q. Now, why didn't you go back to work? Why
did you ignore the company's order to come
back to work after Fackrell got you back on
the jobt
A. Because there was discrimination there. I
don't feel that I should have taken a greater
penalty than somebody else just because he is
the blood of Mr. Fackrell.
Q. Are you talking about Fackrell or Norm Fackrell!
A. That's right.t

Q. Norm Fackrell was a helper, wasn't

he~

A. 1 es, After he lost his driver's license, they
had to make him a helper.
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Q. Wait a minute. Norm Fackrell was helper. You
were a driver.
A. He was hired as a driver.

Q. Wait a minute. N1orm Fackrell was working as
a helper'
A. Ye:s.
Q. And you were working as a driver?
A. A:bsolutely.
Q. Y·our job is much - requires much more
prollllPtness and dispatch than helper ',s does,
doesn't itT

A. That's right.

Q. And you had two more warning notice·s, active
warning notices, than Fackrell, Norm Fackrell,
didn't you?
A. I don't know just exactly how many warning
notices Norm Fackrell got while he was down
there. Very f.ew, I imagine.

Q. Well, you were both fired at the same timeY
A. Absolutely.

Q. And your chief reason that you didn't come
back to work is because they didn't pay you
for the fifteen days you didn't work, and you
support that and justify your conduct there
because N onn FackrellA. It wasn't the pay. It was the principle of the
thing.
Q. All right. It wasn't the pay. It was the principle. N1ow, Norm Fackrell did go back to work,
didn't he?
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A. Yes, but he wasn't going to.

Q. But he did go, didn't heY
A. He had to or else go to jail.
Q. Norn1 Fackrell got a wire to come back to
work, didn't he '
A. Whether he got a wire or what the communication was I do not know.
Q. \V ell, you knew of your own knowledge that he
did go back to work after you were both fired 1
A. Yes, and I know of my own knowledge he was
two hours late the first day he went back to
work.

Q. "\Veil, Mr. Wheatley, I don't want to prolong
this examination unduly. If you will just answer the questions that I ask you, it would save
me from cutting in with an objection, please.
The fact of the matter is you knew Fackrell
went back to w<>rk, and he had been docked ten
working days, the time he wasn't working. You
know that of your own knowledge1

A. I know he went back to work.
Q. Yes, and you know you didn't go back to work 1

A. Yes.
Q. And

)TlOU didn't g<> back to work because Norm
went hack to work. Is that right 1

A. And he received a vacation pay for going back
to work.

Q. He what!
A. He received pay for the two week's he was off.
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He didn't get penalized in effect at all. They
called it his vacation and paid him.
Q. You mean-

A. He suffered no ·penalty. He got two weeks off
as a guise and then received pay as a vacation, which was a rule of his. Wherever he
went, to jail,or wherever it was, he took a vacation or leave of absence.
Q. Well, I don't know about that. The contract,
of course, provide's for vacation, as you well

know, and you got paid for all your vacation
that you took off too, didn't you~
A. I have a~sked to work my vacations, but the
company wouldn't allow me to work my vacation.

Q. Well, now, wait a minute. You had vacations
while you were on that joh~
A. Yes, I did, sir.

Q. And you got paid for those

vacations~

A. Yes, I did.'' (T 39-42)
At this time, the defendants were not contending
plaintiff's complaint did not state a cause of ootion as
plaintiff imp1ies in his hrief or that plaintiff was suing
his own agent and mayhap not in an tenable position.
The defendants took the position that plaintiff's discharge being admittedly for good cause; plaintiff was
therefore barred from the recovery of damages for loss
of tin1e, imposition of penalty or otherwise.
Shortly ater the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony,
the court ruled as follows :
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''THE COURT: no, I don't have a position on
it. I think the contract is clear here that they maycompany may discharge or suspend an employee
for just cause, but it doesn't mean they have to,
and if they don't want to on a fellow that's not
quite SQ litigious and who gets in so many argument's with them, they well might forgive him, and
somebody else who would be more litigious and
more intractable might cause them not to give him
the benefits of this ''may'' provision.
In fact, I am ready to rule. There i~sn 't any
question hut what this fellow wa~s fired for just
cause. The fact that Norm- and Norm was fired
for just cause too, but they put him back. They
put this fellow 'back, but he wouldn't take it. H~is
fuss was over $375, and there is a provision in this
contract as to what to do about getting the money.
He had his job. This. fellow was fired. He ought to
have taken his job back and engaged in the fus1s
over getting his money, and there isn't any need
of letting him run a seven or eight thousand dollar
bill up on us when all he had was $375 involved in
the fil'St place.
The defendants may have judgment for no
cause of action, and the case is dismissed, and the
jury is discharged, and I thank you for your
services.
We will recess until ten o'clock tomorrow
morning." (T 68)
It is familiar doctrine that employers haYe a ri.g-ht to
make rules controlling conduct of its employees and to
discharge or otherwise discipline employees who violate
,,., those rul~~. For example, the employer can make no
~··· smoking rules, rules requiring reports on absences and

1!¢
~~·
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accidents and rules prohibiting collections without per
mission and so on. The employer can even make rule1
restricting solicitation of union membership on companJ
property. The National Labor Relations Act does nol
interfere in any way with an employer's usual operatior
of his business, neither n1ay a labor union. All the Taft.
Hartley Act does is to forbid the employer from thwarting his employees' right to engage in or refrain from
engaging in uni1on activities. It does not prevent him
from discharging or disciplining his workerrS for cause
or for no cause. The Aet merely prevents such action if
the reason for the diseharge is anti-union or pro-union,
and a fortiorari, the Act emphatically prohibits the National Labor Relations Board from reinstating or awarding back pay to employees who were fired for cause; see
Sec. lO(c).
This is not a case where the company breached its
collective bargaining contract or violated some state law
or fired plaintiff because of hi~s union activities and the
defendants at plaintiff's timely request neglected to
process plaintiff's grievance pursuant to the bargaining
eontract, just the opposite appears here. In this area,
the authorities are legion, but we find no case authorities
and ·we think none can be found supporting the conceptual pattern of plaintiff, that notwithstanding he was
fired hecause of three or four successive violations of
uompany rules and three or four company warning notjces and thereafter the union succeeded in ~securing his
job back which he deliberately refused to accept, then
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~

tlll' plaintiff in such situation may recover damages be~· (~ause he lost his job and was re-hired shortly thereafter
1tt E.t the instance of defendant Fackrell.

~

Plaintiff entirely overlooks the fundamental and
: hasic element here involved that the company had the implieit right to fire plaintiff for cause or for no cause and
m.~ was under absolutely no obligation to take plaintiff back
l!ll (which it did at the instance of defendant) under any
'!llt •
•
•
thi s record . H ence, h ow
, mrcumstance·s appeanng·
1n
.t~t: plaintiff expected the company to 1present him a premium
:h; instead of a penalty for hi·s own admitted wrong doing,
·~~
•
the eourt below could not understand why defendants
1
ntr were not entitled to a judgntent of dismissal and neither
·~~r: do defendants.
:f ~!f

ore~

APPELLANT'S CASE AUTHORITIES

~.w

Plaintiff cites the case of Marchitto v. Central Railr toad Company of Netc Jersey, 88 A2d 851 (1925). This
llit.t was an action on six counts against the union and the
~~w:· ehrurman
.
.
.
.
of t he Gr1evance
ComiDittee.
Among
such
b:.. counts was lost seniority, lost wages and a count stating
il!~- that it was the duty of the Grievance Committee Chair:.·- man to .prosecute the claims of union members against
:·> the railroad company which said chairn1an failed to
;.1
,. prosecute.

1ti1ll

1~

The holding of the court was that the action against
.,. the union he dismissed but that the complaint stated a

I 81.1•~
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cause of action against the grievance chairman. Such
holding is of no comfort to the instant plaintiff for the
reason that plaintiff's complaint is not an issue. The defendant has assumed for the purpose of this appeal that
plaintiff's complaint does state a cause of action. Nevertheles,s, the plaintiff admits he was discharged for good
cause, therefore the defendants here take the position
that no cause of action against the defendants could exist.
The plaintiff cites the case of Fetcher v. Colorado ct
Wyo1ning Railway Company, 347 P2d 156 (1959). The
court below in this rna tter dismis,sed the complaint and
the court above reversed. The complaint stated that the
plaintiff was discharged without cause and that the
Brotherhood, Lodge and the individual defendants were
guilty of fraud, breach of duty and collusion with the
railroad c01npany to bring about plaintiff's discharge
without any cause.
In the instant case the pleadings are not an issue.
Plaintiff: cites the case of Fray v. Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, et al, 101 NW2d 782 (1960). The complaint~
this case alleged that plaintiff was unlawfully discharged.
The appellant court held that the plaintiff should have an
opportunity to amend his complaint, hence, reversed the
court belo·w which had dis1nissed the complaint on the
facts pleaded.
The issues in the three cited cases above mentioned
arose on the pleadings -- defendant for the purposes of
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the in:-~tant appPa.l are not attar king plaintiff's complaint;
hence, the ubove cited cases are inapplicable.
The case of Solo v. IA'tlscraft Optical Corporation,
1HO ~.Y.H. :!d 388 (1958) is cited. This case arose out of
processing an arbitration, where fraud, collusion and
misrepresentation were pleaded respecting such arbitral
.
tion proceeding; furthennore, the employees were denied
' their right to individual counsel. Two labor unions, the
~ t'mployer and a grorup of employee'S were involved. rrhe
i nrbitration award was predicated principally on the
~ ~round that the employees were denied the right to coun·: sel of their own choosing.
1

Plaintiff in the case at bar never did seek an appeal
~: lll' rehearing· of the arbitration award and never sought
r. counsel other than Fackrell until after the Board of Arbi~ tration has sustained the ernployer in a decision holding
that the discharg·e of plaintiff by the employer was valid,
legal and justifiied. There was no fraud or collusion ben:
tween the company and the defendants alleged in Wheat.S ley·~ complaint; but as:suming that such were alleged,
; such allegations in vVheatle~'s complaint were not the
~~ i~sue. It is the absolute failure of proof to support the
allegations of complaint which is the issue here· to the
'
~~~ contrary the proof nullified the allegations of plaintiff's
:P eomplaint and none other than \Yheatley supplied such
proof personally.
'

,

".,.herefore to the single point raised by plaintiff, to

~wit: ·_'that plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action
17
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against defendants and the trial court erred as a matter
of law in dismissing said complaint.''
The defendants respond that the pleadings are not
an issue in this ca.se for the reason that the defendants
do not presently deny the complaint states a cause of
action. But an indispensable requisite to the plaintiff's
case is that the proof must disclnse an invalid discharge
of plaintiff by the company. Thus the issue of vital relative consequence is that the plaintiff's own proof and
repeated admissrions disclnse that plaintiff WBJS discharged for cause and good cause which admissions supply abundant proof that the company was justified in the
exercise of its managerial right to discharge plaintiff
and as a result of ·Such valid exercise of management
prerogative no damage to plaintiff cnuld possibly lie
against his employer which is not here sued or the defendants who engaged in an extra gratuity bonus endeavor in negotiating with the company successfully to
the end that plaintiff was later rehired for a similar employment to that fron1 which plaintiff was discharged.
Defendants therefore submit that the court below
·was fully justified in dismissing plaintiff',s cause of action and its decision should be sustained.
All of which is respectfully submitted.

ELIAS HANSEN
CLARENCE M. BECK
Attorneys for D·efendo;nts
arnd Respondents
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